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A Matter of Life and Death: Due Process
Protection in Capital Clemency Proceedings
In the battle over the constitutionality of the death penalty1 dur-
ing the past twenty years, the trial and appellate stages of the capital
punishment process have been scrutinized by the courts2 and reworked
by the state legislatures.3 There has been virtually no attention paid,
1. Supreme Court consideration of the constitutionality of capital punishment pro-
cedures is not a recent phenomenon. See, e.g., Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 71 (1932)(capital sentence imposed on defendants lacking adequate representation violates due
process); In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 449 (1890) (death by electrocution not cruel and
unusual punishment); Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130, 135 (1878) (death by firing squad
not cruel and unusual). However, the argument that the death penalty per se violates
the Constitution is of relatively recent vintage. See Goldberg & Dershowitz, Declaring the
Death Penalty Unconstitutional, 83 HARv. L. Rav. 1773 (1970) (death penalty violates
Eighth Amendment); Gottieb, Testing the Death Penalty, 34 S. CAL. L. REv. 268, 281(1961) (same); cf. Rudolf v. Alabama, 375 U.S. 889, 889-91 (1963) (Goldberg, J., dissenting
from denial of certiorari) (Court should address constitutionality of death penalty for
rape); Brief for the NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund, Inc., and the National
Office for the Rights of the Indigent, as amici curiae at 24-61, Boykin v. Alabama, 395
U.S. 238 (1969) (death penalty cruel and unusual punishment for robbery). See generally
M. MELTSNER, CRUEL AND UNUSUAL (1973) (describing legal strategy of death penalty
opponents). The first essay in America to call for the abolition of the death penalty
was Rush, An Enquiry into the Justice and Policy of Punishing Murder by Death, 4
AM. MUSEUM 78 (1788). See also H. BEDAu, THE DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA 7-13 (1964);
P. MACKEY, VoicEs AGAINST DEATH at i-liii (1976); Filler, Movements to Abolish the Death
Penalty in the United States, 284 ANNALS 124 (1952).
2. In Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 239-40 (1972) (per curiam), the Supreme Court
held that the death penalty, when imposed without sentencing guidelines, is open to
random or discriminatory application, thus violating the Eighth Amendment and the
due process clause. In Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976) (plurality opinion), the Court
approved a capital statute bifurcating guilt and penalty determinations, providing sen-
tencing guidelines, and mandating state appellate court review for disproportionate or
prejudiced sentencing. Accord, Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976) (plurality opinion);
Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976) (plurality opinion). At the same time, the Court
struck down two statutes providing a mandatory death sentence upon conviction of a
capital crime. Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976) (plurality opinion); Woodson
v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976) (plurality opinion). The Supreme Court refined
its constitutional standards for the death penalty in Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625, 637-
43 (1980) (unavailability of instruction on lesser included offense gives jury unconstitu-
tional discretion without guidance), Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 428-29 (1980) (plu-
rality opinion) (vagueness of aggravating circumstance in capital statute allows unconsti-
tutional discretion in application), Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604-05 (1978) (sentencer
must be free to consider any mitigating circumstance), and Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S.349, 355-61 (1977) (plurality opinion) (confidential material not disclosed to defendant
cannot be used in determining death penalty).
3. Under the standard of Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972), virtually every capital
statute then existing was unconstitutional. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 179-80(1976) (plurality opinion). Within four years, 35 states reenacted the death penalty. Id.
Many of these statutes were struck down again under the Court's new standards in
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however, to the clemency 4 stage of that process. 5 Now, as prisoners
are condemned under newly approved procedures6 and as the mora-
torium on executions ends,7 capital clemency has gained importance
Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976) (plurality opinion), and Roberts v.
Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976) (plurality opinion). At the same time, the Court upheld
statutes which then served as a model for constitutionality. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S.
153 (1976) (plurality opinion) (upholding statute requiring bifurcated trial, finding of
aggravating circumstance enumerated by statute, open consideration of mitigating cir-
cumstances, binding of trial court by jury's recommendation of mercy, and comparative
appellate review); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976) (plurality opinion) (upholding
statute requiring bifurcated trial, finding of aggravating circumstance enumerated by
statute, consideration of enumerated mitigating circumstances, trial court not bound byjury's sentencing recommendation, and comparative appellate review); Jurek v. Texas,
428 U.S. 262 (1976) (plurality opinion) (upholding statute requiring bifurcated trial,
finding of three enumerated aggravating conditions, binding of trial court by jury's
recommendation of mercy, and comparative appellate review); see note 2 supra. Since
then, new death penalty statutes have been enacted in 24 states, including two states
that had abolished the death penalty prior to Furman, bringing the total number of
states authorizing capital punishment to 35. National Coalition Against the Death Penalty,
Death Row Census (April 20, 1981).
4. Clemency is a broad term that encompasses pardon, reprieve, commutation of sen-
tence, and remission of fines and forfeitures-all functionally similar executive controls
over judicially imposed punishment. See Solesbee v. Balkcom, 339 U.S. 9, 11-12 (1950)
(power to reprieve has same source as pardon); note 10 infra (listing constitutional and
statutory provisions for clemency). Although clemency is available in noncapital as well
as capital cases, historically it is closely wedded to the death penalty and is used com-
paratively rarely in noncapital cases. S. STAFORD, CLEMENCY: LEGAL AUTHOaTY, P go-
CEDURE, AND STRUCTURE at xiii-xiv (1977); see note 11 infra (distinguishing procedures used
in capital and noncapital clemency). For the purposes of this Note, discussion is limited
to the process of commutation of a death sentence to a term of imprisonment.
5. The Supreme Court has only briefly considered clemency since enunciating the
procedural standard in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972). In the course of rejecting
petitioner's Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment arguments, the Court declined to hold
that the discretion inherent in clemency is unconstitutionally arbitrary. Gregg v. Georgia,
428 U.S. 153, 199 (1976) (plurality opinion). The Gregg decision thus left unchanged the
uncertain constitutional status of state clemency provisions not surrounded by due process
protections. Lower federal and state courts have rejected attacks on clemency procedures.
See Spinkellink v. Wainwright, 578 F.2d 582, 617-19 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S.
976 (1979) (due process not triggered at clemency stage); Sullivan v. Askew, 348 So. 2d
312, 314 (Fla.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 878 (1977) (clemency procedures wholly within
executive discretion); id. at 317 (England, J., concurring) (state's clemency procedures
constitutional under due process standard).
6. See note 3 supra. Seven hundred eighty-four men and eight women are currently
under sentence of death in 31 states. National Coalition Against the Death Penalty,
supra note 3.
7. The annual rate of recorded executions in this country slowed from a high of 199
in 1935 to a handful each year in the mid-1960s. W. BOWERS, ExECUTIONs IN AMRIC 22-
23 (1974).
The reluctance of courts and executives to schedule executions, and the growing burden
of death penalty litigation, resulted in a de facto moratorium on executions from 1967
until Gary Gilmore was executed in Utah in 1977. In 1979, two other prisoners, John
Spenkelink in Florida and Jesse Bishop in Nevada, were put to death. All three men
had been denied clemency. Death Warrant of John Spenkelink (May 18, 1979) (signed by
Florida Governor R. Graham) (on file with Yale Law Journal); Nevada Board of Pardons,
Transcript of Proceedings, Jesse Bishop at 80 (Aug. 25, 1979) (on file with Yale Law
Journal) [hereinafter cited as Bishop Hearing]; Utah Board of Pardons, Transcript of
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as the last chance of relief for death row inmates who are exhausting
their appeals.8
Although clemency is critical to the process of determining pun-
ishment in capital cases, executive authorities today exercise their
power virtually free from procedural control by the courts. Such un-
controlled discretion permits practices that detract from the value of
clemency as the state's final opportunity to assess the appropriateness
of a death sentence. This Note argues that procedural protections
should be extended to the clemency stage of the capital punish-
ment process for clemency to fulfill its expected role in determin-
ing punishment and to satisfy the high procedural standards demanded
by the Supreme Court when life is at stake. The Note recommends
procedural safeguards that would enhance the amount and accuracy
of information available to the clemency authority, without infring-
ing on the substantive discretion inherent in the clemency power.
I. The Capital Clemency Process
Although the reasons for granting capital clemency have varied
historically,9 the executive power to spare prisoners from the death
penalty is deeply rooted in Anglo-American criminal law. As one
link in the chain of decisions by which the state selects offenders for
capital punishment, clemency is functionally integrated with the ear-
lier, judicial stages of the process. Yet the clemency decision also in-
volves the consideration of factors that are not cognizable in the ju-
Proceedings, In re Gary Mark Gilmore at 66-67 (Nov. 30, 1976) (on file with Yale Law
Journal) [hereinafter cited as Gilmore Hearing].
In 1981, Steven Judy was executed in Indiana. A third-party application for clemency
was refused for reasons of standing. Statement of Indiana Parole Board and Clemency
Commission (Mar. 6, 1981) (on file with Yale Law Journal).
8. Since 1976, capital clemency applications have been made in six states-Florida,
Georgia, Indiana, Montana, Nevada, and Utah. Clemency has been denied in eighteen
cases, resulting in three executions, see note 7 supra; granted in five cases, Interview
with Silas Moore, Hearing Examiner, Georgia State Board of Pardons and Paroles, in
Atlanta, Ga. (Mar. 26, 1981) (notes on file with Yale Law Journal); Interview with
Betty Steffens, Deputy General Counsel to the Governor of Florida, in Tallahassee, Fla.
(Mar. 26, 1981) (notes on file with Yale Law Journal); refused for standing reasons in
one case resulting in an execution, see note 7 supra; refused as premature in one case,
see note 12 infra; and determinations are still pending in ten cases, Interview with
Betty Steffens, supra.
9. Compare I L. RADzxNowicz, A HtsroRY OF ENGLISH CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS ADMIN-
ISTATION FROM 1750, at 114-16 (1948) (youth, first offense, provocation, and nonviolent
nature of crime among historical factors in clemency) and F. BRESLER, REPREVE 20, 27,
54-55 (1965) (same) with Note, Executive Clemency in Capital Cases, 39 N.Y.U. L. REv.
136, 159-78 (1964) (disparity in sentencing, mental condition, political pressure, and views
on capital punishment among contemporary reasons for clemency) and Johnson, Selective
Factors in Capital Punishment, 36 SocAL. FoRcas 165, 167 (1957) (same).
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dicial process. Proper exercise of the clemency power requires that
the decisionmaker have full and accurate information about the of-
fender, the offense, and the needs of society, in order to determine
whether to spare the condemned prisoner.
A. The Political Nature of the Clemency Power
Most state constitutions 0 grant executive authorities the power to
spare prisoners from a lawful sentence of death.1' Though it is rare
for state procedure to require a prisoner to await final denial of ju-
dicial relief before seeking clemency, 12 the clemency application ordi-
narily presupposes that no judicial remedy, based entirely on the
jurisdiction's positive criminal law, is available. Widely recognized
reasons for granting executive clemency include the amelioration of
10. All 36 states that authorize the death penalty also have constitutional or statutory
provisions for capital clemency. ALA. CONSr. amend. XXXVIII; ARiz. CONST. art. V, § 5;
ARK. CONST. art. VI, § 18; CAL. CoNsT. art. V, § 8; CoLo. CONsT. art. IV, § 7; CONN. GEN.
STAT. § 18-26 (1981); DEL. CONST. art. VII, § 1; FLA. CONST. art. IV, § 8(a); GA. CoNST.
§ 2-2001; IDAHO CONsTr. art. IV, § 7; ILL. CONST. art. V, § 12; IND. CONST. art. 1T, § 17;
Ky. CONST. § 77; LA. CONSr. art. IV, § 5(E); MD. CONST. art. II, § 20; MIss. CONsr. art.
V, § 124; Mo. CONST. art. IV, § 7; MONT. CONSr. art. VI, § 12; Na. CONsr. art. IV, § 13;
NEv. CONsr. art. V, § 14; N.H. CoNs-r. pt. 2, art. 52; N.M. CONsT. art. V, § 6; N.Y. CoNsr.
art. IV, § 4; N.C. CONsT. art. III, § 5(6); OHIO CONST. art. III, § 11; OKLA. CONST. art. VI,
§ 10; PA. CONsr. art. IV, § 9(a); S.C. CONsr. art. IV, § 14; S.D. CONSr. art. IV, § 3;
TENN. CONsr. art. III, § 6; TFx. CoNsr. art. IV, § 11; UTAH CoNsT. art. VII, § 12; VA.
CONSr. art. V, § 12; VT. CoNsr. ch. II, § 20; WASH. CoNsr. art. III, § 9; WYo. CONST. art.
IV, § 5. See also U.S. CoNsr. art. II, § 2 (President "shall have Power to grant Reprieves
and Pardons for Offenses against the United States, except in Cases of Impeachment.')
In most states, the power to commute a death sentence is one of a set of other func-
tionally similar executive powers such as pardon, reprieve, and restoration of rights.
See, e.g., COLO. CoNsr. art. IV, § 7; GA. CONST. § 2-2001; NEV. CONST. art. V, § 14.
11. Some jurisdictions distinguish clemency in capital cases from clemency in non-
capital cases by vesting the power differently or by specifying different procedures. See,
e.g., ALA. CONsT. amend. XXXVIII (governor has commutation power in capital cases;
legislature has power in noncapital cases); Aiuz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 31-445 (West 1976)
(requirement of publication of reasons for grant of clemency limited to capital cases);
FLA. R. ExEc. CLEMENCY 7 (special rules for capital cases). See generally S. STAITORD, supra
note 4, at 8-90 (summarizing state clemency provisions).
12. See Note, supra note 9, at 153 (purpose of clemency best served when judicial
process complete). In Florida, clemency consideration is triggered by automatic notifi-
cation of the completion of state appellate court review, thus preceding state and federal
habeas remedies. FLA. R. Exac. CLEMENCY 7(A). As a result, the focus of the clemency
process in Florida has been shifted to consideration of judicial, rather than the traditional
extra-judicial, factors. Interview with Richard Shapiro, Director, Southern Prisoners'
Defense Committee, in New Orleans, La. (Oct. 10, 1980) (because of timing of Florida
clemency application, focus is on validity of death sentence, rather than on its appro-
priateness, contrary to classic clemency model) (notes on file with Yale Law Journal)
[hereinafter cited as Shapiro Interview].
Timing in other states is discretionary. In Montana, the governor denied as premature
the clemency application of a prisoner, sentenced under a mandatory statute, who had
delayed his appeal. Interview with Michael McCarter, Assistant Attorney General, in
Helena, Mont. (June 25, 1980) (notes on file with Yale Law Journal). Clemency appli-
cations were considered in Utah and Nevada upon withdrawal of all appeals by petitioners.
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unduly harsh sentences, 13 the exercise of compassion on account of
physical illness or other hardship,14 and the healing of political
wounds.Y
The essential contention of a clemency petition is that the public
interest would be better served by sparing the life of the condemned
than by taking it."' A clemency decision therefore is political in na-
ture, in that it addresses factors that courts are unable to consider
in setting or reviewing sentences.17 Although there are judicially en-
13. See note 9 supra; note 16 infra.
14. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2967.05 (Page 1975) (governor may release dying pris-
oner as if on parole).
15. See, e.g., Pres. Proc. 4483, 3 C.F.R. 4 (1978) (President Carter's amnesty for draft
evaders); Pres. Proc. 4311, 3A C.F.R. 66 (1974) (President Ford's pardon of former-president
Nixon); Pres. Proc. 37, 13 Stat. 758 (1865) (President Andrew Johnson's amnesty for former
secessionists).
16. The Supreme Court, in Biddle v. Perovich, 274 U.S. 480 (1927), stated:
A pardon in our days is not a private act of grace from an individual happening to
possess power. It is a part of the Constitutional scheme. When granted it is the de-
termination of the ultimate authority that the public welfare will be better served
by inflicting less than what the judgment fixed.
Id. at 486. See also DiSalle, Comments on Capital Punishment and Clemency, 25 OHIO
ST. L.J. 71, 77 (1964) (remarks of Averill Harriman, Governor of New York) (clemency
needed to weigh factors that judge and jury could not take into consideration and needed
when law is inflexible); id. at 77 (remarks of G.E. Chamberlain, Governor of Oregon)
(duty of executive branch to equalize uneven administration of justice); Weihofen, Pardon:
An Extraordinary Remedy, 12 RoCKY MTN. L. Rlv. 112, 113 (1940) (clemency needed
when letter of law would violate community sense of justice); Interview with Donnie A.
Lee, Executive Officer, Georgia State Board of Pardons and Paroles, in Atlanta, Ga.
(Oct. 10, 1980) (notes on file with Yale Law Journal) ("The work of the board is the
compassionate part of the criminal justice system.") [hereinafter cited as Lee Interview].
The public interest, inherent in the clemency consideration, may be asserted by third
parties when the condemned prisoner chooses not to apply for clemency. See Gilmore
Hearing, supra note 7, at 8, 9 (witnesses testifying in favor of clemency without pris-
oner's consent); Bishop Hearing, supra note 7, at 56-60 (same). But see Statement of In-
diana Parole and Clemency Board, supra note 7 (refusing third-party clemency applica-
tion). In this regard clemency is again distinguished from strictly judicial proceedings,
in which only the interests of the offender, and the state as represented by the prosecutor,
are recognized. See Evans v. Bennett, 440 U.S. 1301 (1979) (Rehnquist, Circuit Justice)
(rejecting application of prisoner's mother to appeal in his behalf as next friend); Gil-
more v. Utah, 429 U.S. 1012 (1976) (same).
17. Although some factors once considered only by the clemency authority are now
weighed by the sentencer and by the appellate courts in capital cases, see Lockett v.
Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604-07 (1978), clemency remains an essential opportunity for the state
to consider information excluded from previous stages of the capital punishment process,
and to reconsider information previously applied to the case only in a judicial setting.
Thus, the clemency authority may act out of opposition to capital punishment, Eacret v.
Holmes, 333 P.2d 741, 743 (Or. 1958), even though jurors with such scruples may be
barred from serving in capital cases, Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 516-18 (1968),
and appellate courts may not act upon such personal feelings, Furman v. Georgia, 408
U.S. 238, 375 (1972) (Burger, C.J., dissenting); id. at 410-11 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
The clemency authority is also free to weigh purely political considerations. S. STAFFORD,
supra note 4, at xv (pardons may have political aspect); see Note, supra note 9, at 172-75
(politics can affect clemency decision). Other information, such as a prisoner's subsequent
progress toward rehabilitation, or loss of sanity, is unavailable earlier in the punishment-
The Yale Law Journal
forceable jurisdictional limitations on the clemency power,18 a clem-
ency decision itself is, in effect, judicially unreviewable. 19 The ex-
determination process. Information not presented earlier because of inadequate counsel,
strategic considerations, or the unavailability of witnesses may also be heard. Interview
with John C. Boger, Staff Attorney, NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund, Inc.,
in New York, N.Y. (July 2, 1980) (notes on file with Yale Law Journal); see Lee Inter-
view, supra note 16 (clemency board in Georgia reviews new information).
Information considered earlier may be seen in a new light because of differences in
the screening mechanisms. The clemency authority determines for itself both the factors
it will weigh and their relative importance without the direction of statutory guidelines.
See Note, supra note 9, at 177-78. The clemency authority is closer in time to the ex-
ecution of sentence and more remote from the offense, and consequently may shift its
focus from the victim to the offender, thereby giving less weight to retributive notions
of punishment. Interview with Patsy Morris, Georgia Civil Liberties Union, in Atlanta,
Ga. (Oct. 10, 1980) (notes on file with Yale Law Journal). The individual responsibility,
characteristic of most state clemency schemes, differs from the collective responsibility
of sentencers and courts. See note 38 infra (sentencers and courts rely on clemency as
safeguard). Finally, in addition to these institutional distinctions, the fact that different
people may make different decisions based on the same information provides the safe-
guard of an additional level of approval-and opportunity for disapproval-before a death
sentence may be carried out. Rockefeller, Executive Clemency and the Death Penalty,
21 CATH. L. REv. 94, 95 (1971).
18. Civil penalties cannot be commuted, nor can crimes against other jurisdictions,
including the violation of municipal ordinances within the state. 3 U.S. DEP'T OF JUSICE,
SURVEY OF RELEASE PROCEDURES 134-41 (1939) [hereinafter cited as JUSTICE SuRvEY]; cf. F.
MAITLAND, THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF ENGLAND 479 (1908) (no royal pardon power
over civil justice). Substantive limitations are also imposed by the federal and most state
constitutions, with treason and impeachment commonly removed from the executive
power. JUSTICE SURvEY, supra, at 133; S. STAFFORD, supra note 4, at 2, 3; cf. Schick
v. Reed, 419 US. 256, 267 (1974) (limitations on clemency power must be found in
Constitution).
19. Spinkellink v. Wainwright, 578 F.2d 582, 618 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440
U.S. 976 (1979) (clemency decision discretionary and "not the business of judges"); Sullivan
v. Askew, 348 So. 2d 312, 315 (Fla.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 878 (1977) (legislature and ju-
diciary prohibited from encroaching on executive clemency power); Ex parle Crump,
135 P. 428, 431 (Okla. Crim. 1913) (judicial review of clemency would violate separation
of powers); Eacret v. Holmes, 333 P.2d 741, 744 (Or. 1958) (courts cannot review reasons
for clemency); JUsTICE SuRvEY, supra note 18, at 128-32 (exercise of executive clemency can-
not be reviewed by court); id. at 113 (legislature cannot restrict clemency power).
Although courts have held that the substance of a clemency decision is not subject
to judicial review, limitations on the clemency power may be subject to enforcement by
the courts. See Schick v. Reed, 419 U.S. 256, 267 (1974) (limitations on clemency power
must be found in Constitution); McGee v. Arizona State Bd. of Pardons & Paroles, 376
P.2d 779 (Ariz. 1962) (actions of clemency authority reviewable for compliance with state
law and due process); Sullivan v. Askew, 348 So. 2d 312, 317 (Fla.), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
878 (1977) (England, J., concurring) (capital clemency procedures reviewable for minimal
due process standards); JUSTICE SuRvEY, supra note 18, at 130-31 (pardon reviewable for
compliance with state law).
Moreover, if constitutional norms apply to clemency as they do to other governmental
actions, a clemency decision could not be based on constitutionally impermissible reasons.
See Schick v. Reed, 419 U.S. 256, 267 (1974) (conditions imposed with clemency must be
constitutionally unobjectionable). A decision based on race, for example, might be found
to violate the equal protection clause; one based on the flip of a coin might violate the
Eighth Amendment's ban on arbitrariness as enunciated in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S.
238 (1972). This issue has not been directly addressed by the courts. See Note, supra
note 9, at 181-82 (race); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 199-200 (1976) (plurality opinion)
894
Vol. 90: 889, 1981
Clemency
ecutive authority's general accountability to the electorate20 provides
the principal check on clemency decisions.
B. The Place of Capital Clemency Within the
Capital Punishment System
The Anglo-American Tradition. Until recent times, most felonies
in Anglo-American jurisdictions21 were punishable, not by imprison-
ment, but by death.22 In early criminal proceedings, it was difficult
and frequently impossible to assert mitigating facts and to introduce
special defenses.23 In England, before the nineteenth century, the
harshness of capital statutes was mitigated to some extent by the
lenient interpretation of trial judges and by jury nullification-by
finding defendants innocent despite the facts.24 For individuals who
were convicted of capital offenses, clemency provided the principal
opportunity for relief. 25
Crown law officers and ministers who controlled royal clemency
extended mercy to individuals for whom capital punishment seemed
inappropriate, even though they had been convicted and sentenced
(arbitrariness). See also Wolfgang, Kelly, & Nolde, Comparison of the Executed and the
Commuted Among Admissions to Death Row, 53 J. CiuM. L.C. & P.S. 301, 305-11 (1962)
(offenders who are black, foreign-born, or represented by court-appointed counsel less
likely to receive clemency).
20. See Ex parte Crump, 135 P. 428, 431 (Okla. Crim. 1913) (flagrant abuse of clemency
power may warrant impeachment); JusTicE SuRVEY, supra note 18, at 148-53 (impeach-
ment remedy for abuse of pardon power).
21. Chief Justice Marshall attributed the institutional framework of clemency to its
inheritance from British tradition. United States v. Wilson, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 150, 160 (1833).
22. See L. RADziNowicz, supra note 9, at 31-33 (satisfactory secondary punishments
lacking).
The number of statutes carrying a penalty of death increased dramatically in eighteenth-
century England, and peaked at well over 200. Id. at 1-5. The earliest record of colonial
capital statutes, from the Massachusetts Bay Colony dated 1636, shows 13 capital offenses,
each justified by a citation to the Old Testament. Haskins, "The Capitall Lawes of
New England", HARV. L.S. BuLL, Feb. 1956, at 10-11. Laws adopted by Quaker colonists
in South Jersey and Pennsylvania were far milder. But as late as 1837, North Carolina
listed some 25 capital offenses, many slavery-related. H. BmAU, supra note I, at 6-7.
23. Claims of accident, insanity, and self-defense were incorporated into English juris-
prudence through clemency. F. BRnsLm, supra note 9, at 27; Grupp, Some Historical As-
pects of the Pardon in England, 7 AM. J. LEGAL HIsT. 51, 60 (1963).
24. L. RADZINOWICZ, supra note 9, at 91-96; see Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S.
280, 293 (1976) (plurality opinion) (American tradition of jury nullification); H. KALVEN
& H. ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 310-12 (1971) (comparing modem American and early
English jury nullification); D. ROTHMAN, THE DIscovERY OF THE AsYLUM 60 (1971) (nulli-
fication by colonial juries); Note, Daring the Courts: Trial and Bargaining Consequences
of Minimum Penalties, 90 YALE L.J. 597, 600-01 (1981) (defining jury nullification and
citing early English tradition).
25. S. MILSOM, HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE COMMON LAW 367 (1969) (pardon served
some functions later served by appeals); L. RADZINOWICZ, supra note 9, at 116 (clemency
necessary to individualized punishment).
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in accordance with contemporary judicial standards.26 Grants of clem-
ency were not rare; royal pardons appear to have been granted in
substantial proportion to the number of offenses punishable by death.27
In British North America, clemency was exercised by colonial gov-
ernors.28 After independence, following a brief reaction against ex-
ecutive authority, the new American states returned the clemency
power to the governor's office. 29
Within the American tradition, clemency was widely understood
to be an integral part of the system by which the state selected of-
fenders for death;30 no death sentence was truly irrevocable until
the condemned prisoner was actually executed.31 As the implemen-
tation of penological reforms accelerated, 32 the clemency -power at-
tained significance in the overall punishment-determination process
as the opportunity for executive revision of judicial punishments.
As Chief Justice Marshall observed in 1833, such an executive power
was "a constituent part of the judicial system.133
The Contemporary Clemency System. Although trial and appel-
late procedures have changed dramatically since the nineteenth cen-
tury, clemency retains its traditional importance in the process of
determining punishment. It is as routine for a condemned prisoner
to seek clemency today as it is for him34 to seek appellate review.85
26. Among the factors to emerge as reasons to extend mercy were youth, Grupp,
supra note 23, at 61; old age, F. BRESLER, supra note 9, at 54; pregnancy, id.; and the
nonviolent nature of the crime, L. RAnzINOWxCZ, supra note 9, at 114-16.
27. In the last decade of the eighteenth century, more than four-fifths of all con-
victed capital offenders had their sentences remitted. L. RADzsNowIcz, supra note 9, at
120 n.48.
28. Duker, The President's Power to Pardon: A Constitutional History, 18 WM. & MARY
L. REv. 475, 497-501 (1977).
29. JusTicE SURVEY, supra note 18, at 89-90.
30. See United States v. Wilson, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 150, 161 (1833) (pardon is constituent
part of judicial system).
31. Cf. Na. REv. STAT. §§ 83-1, 132 (1976) (death sentence may not be carried out until
ruling on clemency application); F. BR.aLER, supra note 9, at 37-38 (prisoner hanged but
not yet dead cut down from scaffold when pardon received); Note, supra note 9, at 157
(denial of clemency in New York not announced in case of change).
32. The notion that the task of sentencing is to select particular offenders for par-
ticular punishments gained acceptance during the late nineteenth century. See D. RoTH.
MAN, supra note 24, at 57-58 (describing penal reform movement during this period).
33. United States v. Wilson, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 150, 161 (1833) (nineteenth-century view
of clemency).
34. For consistency, masculine pronouns are used throughout this Note because 99%
of condemned prisoners are male. National Coalition Against the Death Penalty, supra
note 3.
35. Interview with John C. Boger, Staff Attorney, NAACP Legal Defense and Educa-
tion Fund, Inc., in New York, N.Y. (Oct. 14, 1980) (notes on file with Yale Law Journal).
In contrast, a condemned prisoner not seeking clemency is considered newsworthy. See
Death Wish, NawswE, Nov. 29, 1976, at 26-33 (Gary Gilmore cover story).
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Attorneys representing death-row inmates believe it is important to
begin planning for clemency petitions long before the exhaustion of
judicial remedies, and they attempt to integrate that planning into
their overall defense strategy.3 6
The other participants in the criminal justice system also retain the
traditional expectation that the clemency petition plays a role in the
state's selection of offenders for the death penalty. Legislators who
draft and revise criminal codes continue to rely upon executive clem-
ency as a politically sensitive mechanism to prevent the imposition
of the death penalty in particular cases. 37 A similar expectation af-
fects judges and juries in capital cases.38 Whether conceived as a power
to correct judicial failures that courts themselves cannot overcome
or as a power to introduce a nonjudicial sense of the public interest
into the process of determining punishment,40 clemency is function-
ally integrated with the rest of the capital punishment system. If clem-
ency is sought, the state cannot take an offender's life until the ex-
36. Southern Prisoners' Defense Committee, A Handbook for Attorneys Representing
Prisoners Before the Florida Clemency Board 8 (1980) (on file with Yale Law Journal);
Interview with John C. Boger, supra note 35 (preparation for clemency should begin as
soon as attorney takes case); Interview with David E. Kendall, Attorney for John
Spenkelink, in Washington, D.C. (June 30, 1980) (notes on file with Yale Law Journal).
37. Interview with Henry Schwarzschild, Director, ACLU Capital Punishment Project,
in New York, N.Y. (May 7, 1980) (legislators cite opportunity for clemency among safe-
guards against error justifying their vote in favor of capital punishment) (notes on file
with Yale Law Journal).
38. See In re Anderson, 69 Cal. 2d 613, 623, 447 P.2d 117, 124, 73 Cal. Rptr. 21, 28
(1968) (clemency is safeguard against arbitrary jury action); People v. Broncado, 188 N.Y.
150, 151, 80 N.E. 935, 936 (1907) (additional mitigating circumstances should be sub-
mitted to governor for consideration at clemency); W. Hum, THE EXECUTrION OF PRIVATE
SLOVIK 169, 173 (1970) (court martial and reviewing authorities expected President to
grant clemency); B. WOLFE, PILEUP ON DEATH Row 37, 38 (1973) (judge, denying motion
for stay of execution, attributed opportunity to raise humanitarian concerns to clemency);
id. at 177, 178 ("In making your determination as to the penalty to be imposed, you
may . . . consider as a possible consequence that the law of this state provides that a
defendant sentenced . . . to death . . . may be pardoned or have his sentence reduced
by the Governor .... ") (quoting California jury instructions now prohibited); Leavy,
Mamie Lee Ward on Death Row, Ms., Nov. 1975, at 70, 106 (interviews with jurors re-
vealed belief that death sentence would lead to longer imprisonment rather than ex-
ecution); Mailer, Until Dead, PARADE, Feb. 8, 1981, at 8 (Gary Gilmore's prosecutor be-
lieved death sentence would be commuted).
39. See Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 476 (1963) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (appellee's remedy
lies with executive clemency rather than judicial power).
40. The Court in Ex parte Grossman, 267 U.S. 87 (1925), stated:
Executive clemency exists to afford relief from undue harshness or evident mistake
in the operation or enforcement of the criminal law. The administration of justice
by the courts is not necessarily always wise or certainly considerate of circumstances
which may properly mitigate guilt. To afford a remedy, it has always been thought
essential in popular governments, as well as in monarchies, to vest in some other
authority than the courts power to ameliorate or avoid particular criminal judg-
ments. It is a check entrusted to the executive for special cases.
Id. at 120-21.
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ecutive authority has determined that no reason exists to commute
the death sentence.
C. Systemic Features
Two systemic features of clemency reflect its anomalous character
as the final, essentially political inquiry into the appropriateness of
a lawful death sentence at the end of the judicial process. The first
feature is its insulation from judicial review. The political character
of clemency makes freedom from judicial control important to the
performance of the executive branch's function.4 1 It is precisely be-
cause society remains uneasy with the judicial process of criminal
law enforcement that it has placed outside the courts the power to
review and adjust sentences. 42
The legislature, the courts, and the public expect, however, that
a clemency authority will gather and consider all the information
that could affect its decision. 43 Consideration of a clemency applica-
tion is the state's last opportunity to gather information about the
prisoner and his conduct, and to formulate an official response.44
The prisoner,45 his family,46 prison officials, 47 judges,48 state prose-
cutorial officials, 49 and other members of the community5°-at times
41. See p. 893 supra; note 21 supra.
42. See note 40 supra.
43. The informational role to be played by clemency is not a new expectation. Lord
Eldon described a monthly session on clemency at the Old Bailey:
I was exceedingly shocked. . . the first time I attended to hear the Recorder's re-
port, at the careless manner in which, as it appeared to me, it was conducted. We
were called upon to decide on sentences, affecting no less than the lives of men,
and yet there was nothing laid before us, to enable us to judge whether there had
or had not been any extenuating circumstances ....
L. RADZINOWICZ, supra note 9, at 116.
44. Rockefeller, supra note 17, at 95 ("[E]xecutive clemency provides the state with a
final deliberative opportunity to reassess the moral and legal propriety of the awful penalty
which it intends to inflict.')
45. See, e.g., R. MEEROPOL 8= M. MEEROPOL, WF ARE YouR SoNs 224-26 (1975) (letter
from Ethel Rosenberg to President Eisenhower asking for clemency); B. WoLFE, supra
note 38, at 49, 50 (letter from Aaron Mitchell to Governor Pat Brown asking for clemency);
Lee Interview, supra note 16 (clemency investigation begins with interview of inmate).
46. See, e.g., R. MEEROPOL & M. MEEROPOL, supra note 45, at 223 (letter from son
of Julius and Ethel Rosenberg to President Eisenhower, asking for clemency for parents);
B. WOLFE, supra note 38, at 32 (mother of condemned weeping at clemency hearing);
Lee Interview, supra note 16 (state interviews parents of clemency applicant).
47. See F. BRMsLER, supra note 9, at 97, 101 (information from prison guards used
by British clemency authority); Note, supra note 9, at 168 (guards testified as to re-
habilitation of clemency applicant).
48. See L. RADzINOwICZ, supra note 9, at 111-13 (judge's recommendation is important);
Note, supra note 9, at 170-72 (opinion of trial and appellate judges taken into account);
Lee Interview, supra note 16 (same).
49. See Note, supra note 9, at 171-72 (recommendation of prosecutor weighed by
clemency authority); note 58 infra (prosecutors involved in clemency decisions).
50. See 1 H. Twiss, LirE oF LoRD C*ANCELLOR EMON 398-99 (London 1844), cited in
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even representatives of the victimt-traditionally have provided in-
formation to the clemency authority.
II. Executive Performance in Capital Clemency Decisionmaking
The correctness of a decision to grant or deny clemency is, at
present, substantively unreviewable by the courts. Moreover, public
disapproval of clemency decisions has only muffled effect at the polls.
It is therefore difficult to assess the quality of executive decisionmak-
ing in capital clemency cases. Yet, in light of the expected functions
of clemency, it is possible to determine whether current clemency
procedures ensure that clemency performs its role in the process of
determining punishment.
A. Current Practices
Capital clemency procedures vary among jurisdictions. Most states
and the federal government vest the clemency power solely in the
chief executive, although some give authority to a clemency board or
to the governor acting upon the recommendation of such a board.52
The executive officers possessing clemency authority generally dele-
gate the investigation of clemency applications to their staff or to a
government agency.53 Medical and psychiatric information, as well
as nonexpert information, may be considered. 54 The applicant may
provide information to the clemency authority through written sub-
L. RADzINOwIcZ, supra note 9, at 116 n.35 (clemency granted when recommended by
cabinet official from locale of offense); Johnson, supra note 9, at 167 (community opinion
is factor in clemency); Southern Prisoners' Defense Committee, supra note 36, at 19
(mobilizing support of community in which crime committed may be helpful).
51. See L. RADZINOWICZ, supra note 9, at 115; Bishop Hearing, supra note 7, at 71;
Lee Interview, supra note 16 (Georgia Board of Pardons and Paroles interviews victim's
family).
52. The governor has sole authority in 31 states; clemency boards have sole power
in 10 states; the governor has power upon the recommendation of a board in 7 states.
S. STAFFO.RD, supra note 4, at 1. Two states have different systems. California vests the
power in the governor except in the case of twice-convicted felons, when the recom-
mendation of the majority of the state supreme court is required. CAL. CONsT. art. V, §
8. The Rhode Island governor can grant clemency only with the consent of the state
senate. R.I. CONST. amend. II.
53. See, e.g., Nav. Rav. STAT. § 213.040 (prosecuting attorney required to prepare fac-
tual statement for clemency board); N.Y. ExEc. LAw § 259(c)(8) (McKinney Supp. 1972-
1980) (governor may request investigation by Board of Parole); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-
62-3(a) (hearing is the only required information-gathering opportunity for clemency
board); FLA. R. ExEc. CLEMENcY 7 (clemency authority may request investigation by Parole
and Probation Commission); Lee Interview, supra note 18 (Georgia Board of Pardons
and Paroles has own investigatory staff).
54. See Shapiro Interview, supra note 12 (psychiatric testimony important in clemency
application); Interview with Patsy Morris, supra note 17 (medical and psychiatric testi-
mony important).
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missions,5 5 witness testimony,58 and oral presentations." The prosecu-
tor 5s and others who oppose clemency 9 may also provide information.
When such information, particularly expert information, generates
uncertainties and disputes about the applicant's case,60 the clemency
authorities must resolve them.
B. Procedural Inadequacies of Current Practices
The absence in many states of procedural guarantees that assure
the clemency applicant fair access to the decisionmaker and an op-
portunity to present his case jeopardize the completeness6' and the
55. Affidavits are particularly important in states in which the direct testimony of
witnesses is not allowed. Shapiro Interview, supra note 12; see FLA. R. ExEc. CLEMENCY
7(A), (D) (oral presentation at hearing limited to attorneys).
56. Witness testimony is sometimes allowed, see, e.g., Bishop Hearing, supra note 7,
but is prohibited in Florida, see FLA. R. EXEC. CL mENcy 7(A), (D); Shapiro Interview,
supra note 12.
57. Florida limits oral presentation by the attorney for the applicant and the prose-
cuting attorney to 30 minutes each. FLA. PL Exxc. CIEMENCY 7(D).
58. Twenty-seven states have a statutory requirement that the prosecutor be notified
of applications for clemency. S. STAFFORD, supra note 4, at 2 n.7; see, e.g., ARiz. REv. STAT.
§ 31-442 (West 1976); CAL. PENAL CODE § 4803 (West 1981); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. §
15:572.4(B) (West 1981).
In clemency hearings held in Florida and Georgia following the Supreme Court's de-
cision in Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976), prosecuting attorneys argued against
clemency by reiterating the aggravating circumstances underlying the original death
sentence. E.g., Transcript of Clemency Hearing, Willie Darden (Fla. May 8, 1979) (on
file with Yale Law Journal); Summary of Commutation Proceedings, Georgia v. Dix
(May 18, 1978) (on file with Yale Law Journal). In one case, the prosecutor passed out
color photographs of the murder victim to the clemency board. Transcript of Clemency
Hearing at 19, James Dupree Henry (Fla. May 17, 1979) (on file with Yale Law Journal).
In Florida and Nevada, the state's chief prosecutorial officer, the attorney general, is a
member of the clemency board. See FLA. CONST. art. IV, § 8(2) (approval of three cabinet
members required for clemency); id. art. IV, § 4(a), (c) (attorney general is member of
cabinet and chief state legal officer); NEv. CONsT. art. V, § 14 (attorney general is member
of clemency board).
59. Many states require publication of notice of a clemency hearing in the county
of conviction. E.g., Miss. CONsT. art. V, § 124; Aiuz. REv. STAT. § 31-442 (West 1976).
Investigation by the clemency authority may also reveal opposition to a clemency appli-
cation. See Lee Interview, supra note 16 (some interviewed oppose grant of clemency).
60. Interview with John C. Boger, supra note 35 (expert witnesses may provide con-
tradictory testimony).
61. When the state has responsibility for gathering information, institutional factors
may prevent some information from being obtained. The applicant may not trust the
state's investigator and may decline to reveal information that might otherwise be helpful
to him. See, e.g., Lee Interview, supra note 16 (prisoner would not provide access to
certain data after evaluating interviewer). Witnesses for the applicant may be intimidated
by the state interviewer. Shapiro Interview, supra note 12 (poor black witnesses may be
intimidated by state interviewer, usually white parole officer). Moreover, the state in-
vestigator's role is distinct from that of an advocate for the applicant. Lee Interview,
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reliability of the information that the clemency authority may con-
sider. Without an attorney, 62 without knowledge of all the informa-
tion held against him,63 without an opportunity to appear personally
before the clemency authority,64 without adequate notice65 of a hear-
ing, or without any hearing at all,66 the condemned prisoner cannot
correct or rebut information adverse to his application. The lack of
procedural safeguards67 thus converts the clemency proceeding into
an opportunity for state prosecutorial officers to exert, possibly with-
out check, all their powers of persuasion against the condemned pris-
oner. The states' failure to provide procedures for full consideration
of a clemency application may cause the decision to reflect an inac-
curate view of the case. The procedural inadequacies thus undercut
the broad societal expectation that the clemency authority, as the
state's last participant in the capital punishment process, will act de-
liberatively and with care.
supra note 16 (investigator tries to remain objective). Lack of resources-time and money
-may also hamper the applicant's attorney in making a complete investigation. Inter-
view with David E. Kendall, supra note 36; Shapiro Interview, supra note 12.
62. Whether a clemency applicant is guaranteed counsel varies from state to state.
The California Supreme Court guarantees a condemned prisoner representation by an
attorney at the clemency stage. In Re Anderson, 69 Cal. 2d 613, 633, 447 P.2d 117, 181,
78 Cal. Rptr. 21, 35 (1968). Some states do not guarantee counsel. E.g., GEORGIA STATE
BOARD OF PARDONS AND PAROLES, R ULE BOOK 5 (1979). Counsel is guaranteed by statute
or administrative rule in some states, e.g., FLA. STAT. 925.035(4) (1979), but the adequacy
of appointed representation is disputed, see Wolfgang, Kelly, & Nolde, supra note 19, at
809 (higher percentage of applicants with privately retained counsel granted clemency
than those represented by court-appointed attorneys); Interview with Patsy Morris, supra
note 17 (attorney for clemency applicant failed to appear at hearing; "obviously unpre-
pared" at subsequently scheduled hearing); cf. FLA. STAT. § 925.035(4) (1979) (limiting
compensation of appointed counsel to $1000).
63. Georgia classifies information privately revealed to clemency authority as a "state
secret." GEORGIA STATE BOARD OF PARDONS AND PARoi.Es, RULE BOOK 6 (1979). Florida
permits, but does not require, confidential information contained in the report of the
Parole and Probation Commission to be revealed to the attorney for the applicant.
FLA. R. EXEC. CLEMENCY 7(B)(b). However, there is no explicit requirement that con-
fidential information obtained by the governor or cabinet from other sources must be
revealed. Id. 7(E); Shapiro Interview, supra note 12.
64. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 11 n.2, Sullivan v. Askew, 848 So. 2d 312 (Fla.),
cert denied, 434 U.S. 878 (1977) (rules officially construed as barring inmate's presence);
Interview with Craig Barnard, Attorney for Florida clemency applicants, in West Palm
Beach, Fla. (July 8, 1980) (request for appearance by inmate denied) (notes on file with
Yale Law Journal); Lee Interview, supra note 16 (no appearance by inmates permitted
in Georgia as matter of practice).
65. Bishop Hearing, supra note 7, at 24 (less than 24 hour notice).
66. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 147-21 to -25 (1974) (no provision for hearing);
OHIO REv. CODE ANN. §§ 2967.08, .07 (Page 1975) (authorizing investigation but no
hearing); Interview with David Emil, supra note 18 (New York practice is investigation
but no hearing).
67. See notes 5, 19 supra (courts have not favored arguments that constitutional re-
quirements apply at clemency stage).
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III. Constitutional Protection for the Applicant
The unique severity of the punishment of death"" has important
implications for the clemency process. The Supreme Court has sur-
rounded the death penalty with special procedural protections for
persons accused or convicted of capital offenses.0 9 Because clemency
is functionally integrated with the earlier stages of the process of de-
termining punishment, certain procedural protections that currently
exist prior to a clemency application should be enforced when a con-
demned prisoner seeks clemency.
A. Procedural Protections in Death Penalty Cases
Although unwilling to hold that capital punishment itself is un-
constitutional, 0 the Supreme Court has applied strict procedural
standards to the state's power to use the death penalty.71 The dif-
68. The unifying theme of the Supreme Court's recent capital punishment decisions
is that death is a punishment different from all others. E.g., Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S.
625, 637-38 (1980) (constitutional difference between death and lesser punishments often
stated); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 605 (1978) (Burger, C.J.) (death profoundly dif-
ferent from all other penalties); Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 357-58 (1977) (plurality
opinion) (Stevens, J.) (government taking life of citizen differs dramatically from any other
state action); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976) (plurality opinion)
(Stewart, Powell, & Stevens, Jj.) (death differs more from life imprisonment than
100-year prison term differs from term of year or two); id. at 323 (Rehnquist, J., dis-
senting) (death is different because irreversible, ultimate penalty); Furman v. Georgia,
408 U.S. 238, 286-91 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring) (death penalty uniquely degrading
to human dignity); id. at 306 (Stewart, J., concurring) (death different not in degree
but in kind); see Evans v. Bennett, 440 U.S. 1301, 1306 (1979) (Rehnquist, Circuit Jus-
tice) (irreversibility of death penalty compels granting stay of execution); Furman v.
Georgia, 408 U.S. at 358-60 (Marshall, J., concurring) (death penalty excessive and morally
unacceptable punishment violating Eighth Amendment).
69. Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625, 637-38 (1980) (procedures decreasing reliability
invalidated because death is different); see Radin, Cruel Punishment and Respect for
Persons: Super Due Process for Death, 53 S. CAr. L. REv. 1143 (1980) (examining link
between uniqueness of death penalty and procedural requirements). The notion that
death penalty cases compel more stringent procedural requirements was articulated by
the Supreme Court long before the most recent cases. See Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 77
(1957) (Harlan, J., concurring in result) (process due in noncapital case may not suffice
in capital case); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 21 (1956) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)
(capital offenses are sui generis); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 71 (1932) (due process
requires appointment of effective counsel in capital cases). Contra, Williams v. New York,
337 U.S. 241, 251 (1949) (declining to draw constitutional distinction in procedure when
death may be imposed). The Court later limited the procedural holding in Williams
to noncapital cases because the constitutional difference in death as a punishment had
since been recognized. Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 357 (1977) (plurality opinion).
70. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976) (plurality opinion); see Furman v. Georgia,
408 U.S. 238 (1972). See generally note 2 supra (describing evolution of recent capital
cases).
71. The Court derives this procedural requirement from two sources. In Furman v.
Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972), the Court held that capital punishment, when its impo-
sition is utterly discretionary, is open to random or discriminatory application, and there-
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ference between death and all other punishments, the Court has
reasoned,72 gives rise to a "corresponding difference in the need for
reliability in the determination that death is the appropriate pun-
ishment in a specific case." 73 Two general procedural values have
emerged in the Court's new capital punishment doctrine: the im-
portance of individualized sentencing, and the need to minimize in-
formational errors.74
1. Individualized Sentencing
Since its decision in Furman v. Georgia 7 5 the Supreme Court has
reviewed a variety of state statutes that establish procedures for se-
lecting serious criminal offenders for the death penalty. Statutes that
left state courts no discretion to show leniency in individual cases-
the so-called "mandatory" death penalty laws-were struck down in
fore unconstitutional. The Court thus provided procedural content to the Eighth Amend-
ment and the equal protection clause.
The Court has also relied on the due process clause, the more traditional source of
procedural protection. See Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 362 (1977) (plurality opinion).
But see id. at 364 (White, J., concurring in judgment) (resting opinion on Eighth Amend-
ment); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 255-56 (1972) (Douglas, J., concurring) (Eighth
Amendment incorporates requirements of due process clause). See generally note 2 supra
(outlining procedural requirements in capital cases).
72. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976) (plurality opinion).
73. Id. at 305.
74. These concerns correspond to the instrumental theory of the value of due process,
which holds that due process serves to implement the rule of law by minimizing error
in the law's application. In contrast, the theory of the intrinsic value of due process
is that regardless of the correctness of the result, it is important that a decision be
reached through a fair procedure, one that engenders a feeling of just treatment. See
Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 162-72 (1951) (Frank-
furter, J., concurring) (important for popular government to generate feeling that justice
has been done); id. at 179 (Douglas, J., concurring) (adherence to procedural safeguards
best assurance of equal justice under law); L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTTT ONAL LAw
501-06 (1978) (describing instrumental and intrinsic value theories); Michelman, Formal
and Associational Aims in Procedural Due Process, in NoMos XVIII, DuE PROCESS 126,
126-29 (J. Fennock & J. Chapman eds. 1977) (Yearbook of American Society for Political
and Legal Philosophy) (distinguishing between legal and social functions of due process).
This feeling of just treatment is especially important when what is at stake represents
the most profound expression of governmental authority: the power over life and death.
From the point of view of society, the action of the sovereign in taking the life of
one of its citizens ... differs dramatically from any other legitimate state action.
It is of vital importance to the defendant and to the community that any decision
to impose the death sentence be, and appear to be, based on reason rather than
caprice or emotion.
Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 357-58 (1977) (plurality opinion) (emphasis added).
The validity and moral authority of a conclusion largely depend on the mode by
which it is reached. Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 US. at 171.
When the procedural protections that routinely safeguard decisions of far less moment
are absent, the appearance of justice-indeed, the essence of justice-is denied.
75. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
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1976.76 The Court has approved death penalty laws that sever the
determination of guilt from the fixing of sentence.7 7 Subsequently,
in Lockett v. Ohio,7 8 the Court disapproved a statute that restricted
consideration of mitigating factors to a limited number of theories.7 9
At sentencing, the Court has held, the offender must be permitted
to offer a range of arguments and facts in favor of a penalty less than
death.80 Thus, only carefully individualized sentencing will meet
the majority's requirements.8'
The post-Furman decisions have, in effect, required the states that
employ capital punishment to enhance an offender's opportunities to
explain why he should not be selected for the punishment of death.
The state capital punishment laws disapproved by the Supreme Court
since Furman are those that, like a one-way ratchet, operate to tighten
gradually and irreversibly the grip of a death sentence on an offender;
the approved procedures, on the other hand, permit an offender to
escape the death penalty at a number of points in the process of
determining punishment.8 2 Individualized sentencing thus involves
a policy that favors the exclusion of offenders from the death penalty.
2. Minimization of Informational Error
The Supreme Court also requires procedural protections designed
to enhance the accuracy of information used by courts in determin-
ing the punishment of persons convicted of capital offenses. Although
confidential presentence reports are routinely relied on in noncapi-
tal cases, the Court's protections prohibit their use in capital cases
because the "risk that some of the information accepted in confidence
may be erroneous or may be misinterpreted, by the investigator or
76. Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976) (plurality opinion); Woodson v. North
Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976) (plurality opinion); cf. Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625,
638-43 (1980) (prohibition against instructing jury on lesser included offenses is uncon-
stitutional in capital case). The Court has reserved for decision the constitutionality of
a mandatory death-penalty statute for murder or assault with a deadly weapon com-
mitted by a life-term prisoner. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. at 292 n.25 (dictum).
77. See note 2' supra (bifurcation feature of death penalty laws approved as con-
stitutional).
78. 438 U.S. 586 (1978).
79. Id. at 607-08; see OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 2929.04(B) (Page 1975).
80. Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604-05 (1978).
81. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 313 (White, J., concurring) (capital sentencing
scheme must provide meaningful basis for distinguishing few cases in which death penalty
is imposed from those in which it is not); see Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625, 638-43
(1980) (unavailability of lesser included offense instruction gives jury discretion that is un-
constitutional without standards); Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 428-29 (1980) (plurality
opinion) (vagueness of capital statute's definition of aggravating circumstances allows
unconstitutional discretion in application).
82. See note 2 supra (describing procedures required for imposition of death sentence).
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by the sentencing judge, is manifest."83 Such reports introduce a risk
of error unacceptable when life is at stake. The Court has held that
sentencing information must be submitted to an offender to permit
the "debate between adversaries [which] is often essential to the truth-
seeking function."8 4
B. The Death Penalty Doctrine's Challenge to
Executive Clemency Procedures
Clemency, no less than other decisions in the capital punishment
process, involves these two procedural values. The principle of in-
dividualized sentencing lies at the heart of both the historical and
contemporary models of executive clemency:85 perhaps at no other
stage of the capital punishment process is the state's power to exclude
offenders from a death sentence more dramatic. Avoiding informa-
tional errors is also as important at the end of the process of deter-
mining punishment as it is earlier. Indeed, clemency long predates
sophisticated judicial sentencing procedures as a method for present-
ing mitigating information. 8
Procedural inadequacies in the current system suggest, however,
that clemency decisions may be based on seriously incomplete views
of a petitioner's case.87 If information is inadequate or inaccurate, the
clemency decision cannot contribute to rational, individualized pun-
ishment,8  nor can it be trusted to be free of informational error.89
The Court's constitutional design for administration of the death pen-
83. Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 359 (1977) (plurality opinion).
84. Id. at 360. But see Brown v. Wainwright, 28 CrIM. L. REP. (BNA) 2477, 2478
(Fla. Sup. Ct. Jan. 15, 1981) (exposure of state supreme court justices to material withheld
from appellant did not taint required review of death sentence).
85. See pp. 892-93, 895-96 supra (historical and contemporary function of clemency is
to tailor punishment to individual).
86. See id. (clemency is opportunity for consideration of mitigating factors); note 17
supra (despite consideration of mitigating circumstances by sentencer, clemency still per-
forms unique function).
87. See pp. 900-01 supra (inadequacies of current clemency procedures). A collection
of abuses under current clemency provisions has never been attempted on a systematic
basis. Because of the current unaccountability of the decisionmaker, many information
abuses are likely to remain hidden.
88. See Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604-05 (1978) (Burger, C.J.) (incomplete infor-
mation does not satisfy constitutional requirement for individualized sentencing).
89. Clemency cannot properly function with inaccurate information. Thus Lord Chuter-
Ede, the British Home Secretary who, in 1950, failed to grant clemency to a man later
given a posthumous pardon, said, "I did not make a mistake . . . .The mistake was
that the whole of the facts were not before the court." F. BRESLER, supra note 9, at 224;
cf. Townsend v. Burke, 334 U.S. 736, 741 (1948) (sentence based on misinformation cannot
stand). For examples of people convicted of capital crimes who were later discovered to
have been innocent, see H. BEDAu, supra note 1, at 434-52, and G. Mium, INmvrrAoN To
A LYNCHING (1976).
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alty is therefore frustrated at the last stage of the process.00
In light of the Supreme Court's death penalty doctrine, such a
gap between clemency's ideal function and its actual operation forces
a choice upon the states. Conceivably, states might abolish capital
clemency. So long as they consider clemency important enough, how-
ever, to play its traditional role in their capital punishment system,
the states should ensure that the Court's general standards for ac-
curacy are met when the fate of condemned prisoners comes before
their clemency authorities for review.
1. Abolishing Capital Clemency
The first alternative, abolishing capital clemency, would cure pro-
cedural inadequacies at the end of the process of determining punish-
ment by eliminating clemency as a feature of a state's constitutional
and statutory law. Abolition of capital clemency might itself, however,
entail federal constitutional problems. The capital clemency power
has always played an unquestionably important role in American crim-
inal law enforcement,9 1 and each state whose capital punishment law
has been approved by the Supreme Court since Furman v. Georgia2
has a clemency provision.93 Given the importance the Court has at-
tached to mechanisms for excluding individuals from the punish-
ment of death,94 a death penalty law that lacks a clemency provision
might violate the Eighth and the Fourteenth Amendments."3 Earlier
stages of the punishment-determination process could serve some of
90. The practical results can be easily demonstrated. The Court ruled in Gardner v.
Florida, 430 U.S. 349 (1977) (plurality opinion), that a judge could not rely on a con-
fidential presentence report in deciding upon a death sentence. See pp. 904-05 supra.
Yet unless the protection of the due process clause is extended to the clemency stage,
the same information deemed too unreliable for the judge can be presented to the clem-
ency authority and serve as the basis for its life-or-death decision. The constitutional
value recognized by the Court in Gardner would be subverted.
91. See pp. 895-98 supra (clemency is integral part of criminal justice system).
92. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
93. Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 274 (1976) (plurality opinion) (executive clemency
approved as part of process of exempting persons from death sentence); Proffitt v.
Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 254 (1976) (plurality opinion) (same); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S.
153, 199 (1976) (plurality opinion) (same); see FLA. CONsr. art. IV, § 8(a) (governor may
commute death sentence with approval of three cabinet members); GA. CONST. § 2-2001
(Board of Pardons and Paroles may commute death sentence unless governor refuses to
reprieve); TEx. CONSr. art. IV, § 11 (governor may commute death sentence upon advice
of Board of Pardons and Parole).
94. See pp. 903-04 supra (statutes must afford opportunity to be excluded from
death sentence).
95. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 199 n.50 (1976) (plurality opinion) (dictum)
(capital punishment system without clemency provision "would be totally alien to our
notions of criminal justice").
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the functions of clemency.9 6 Yet the commitment of final reviewing
power to political authorities could hardly be duplicated in a system
lacking a clemency feature without a radical change in the character
of the earlier, judicial proceedings.
2. Complying with Procedural Standards at the Clemency Stage
If, instead of abolishing capital clemency, the states retain the clem-
ency power within the capital punishment process, their clemency
authorities should conform to the Supreme Court's procedural stan-
dards for administering the death penalty. The federal courts should
enforce the requirement that states implement procedures to ensure
that the clemency decisionmaker receives complete and accurate in-
formation. 97
Unlike abolition of capital clemency, judicial supervision of clem-
ency procedures required by the Supreme Court's death penalty doc-
trine would leave intact the traditional multiple-stage capital punish-
ment process. In order to protect the assertedly political nature of
clemency, the federal courts should impose procedural requirements
on executive authorities in ways that leave the substantive decision-
making power of those authorities undisturbed.98 The courts would
96. But see note 17 supra (clemency serves unique function).
97. Although procedural protection can assure that information comes before the
clemency authority, that body still retains the power to make a decision disregarding
the facts. A random or otherwise irrational choice is therefore possible. But see note 19
supra (random choice may be unconstitutionally arbitrary). However, the gravity of the
question, accountability within the political process, and other institutional constraints
may steer the choice toward the rational, in which information is valuable, rather than
the purely random, in which information is irrelevant. See Roberts v. Louisiana, 428
U.S. 325, 350 (1976) (White, J., dissenting) ("The country's experience with the commu-
tation power does not suggest that it is a senseless lottery, [or] that it operates in an
arbitrary or discriminatory manner .... ) Contra, C. BLAcK, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT: THE
INKvITABILITY or CAPRICE AND MISTAKE 74 (1974) (decision on clemency is final irrational
choice in series of such choices); Wolfgang, Kelly, & Noble, supra note 19, at 305-11
(offenders who are black, foreign-born, or represented by court-appointed counsel less
likely to be granted clemency).
98. This distinction is currently made in the administrative law context. See Citizens
to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416-17 (1971) (court may review
executive decision for procedural compliance but may not substitute its judgment); United
States ex rel. Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 347 U.S. 260, 266-67 (1954) (Attorney General must
adhere to procedural requirements notwithstanding discretion). The task, however, must
be handled sensitively to keep procedure from swallowing substance. Cf. Underwood, The
Thumb on the Scales of Justice: Burdens of Persuasion in Criminal Cases, 86 YALE L.J.
1299, 1318 (1977) (procedural change may mask Nubstantive change). Compare Breyer,
Vermont Yankee and the Courts' Role in the Nuclear Energy Controversy, 91 HARv. L.
REv. 1833, 1835 (1978) (imposition of more stringent procedural requirements favors the
status quo) with Stewart, Vermont Yankee and the Evolution of Administrative Pro-
cedure, 91 HAxv. L. Rv. 1805, 1811 n.26 (1978) (courts must look to principles, not pre-
dictions of impact, in determining standard of review).
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not guarantee a prisoner a right to clemency; a prisoner instead would
have a right to procedural protections that ensure care and accuracy
in the clemency decision. 99 By enforcing compliance with current death
penalty doctrine at the clemency stage, the courts would in fact mere-
ly enforce the traditional expectation of care and accuracy in the
administration of clemency.
C. Specific Procedural Requirements-
The Supreme Court's standards for individualized sentencing and
minimization of informational error require several simple procedur-
al protections. 100 Because the clemency decision involves a wide range
of factors, issues raised in particular cases may make additional pro-
cedures essential in order to meet the constitutional standard. En-
forcing those procedural requirements would enhance the ability of
the clemency authority to function as the final and political stage of
review in capital cases.
The clemency authority should permit an applicant, his supporters,
the state authorities, and the public at large to comment upon a
clemency petition.' 0 ' Because of the breadth of factors involved in a
clemency application, participants could urge granting or denying
clemency for any reason. To protect the accuracy of the process, any
person should also be permitted to comment upon other submissions
to the clemency authority, and all comments should be public, so
that factual errors or distortions might be challenged.' 0 2 Such a pro-
ceeding would enhance the public character of the clemency deci-
99. A constitutional interest in the character of the procedure is analytically distinct
from a right to a particular result. Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 358 (1977) (plurality
opinion); see Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 185 (1951)
(Jackson, J., concurring) (even if there is no legal right to government job, one cannot
be adjudged ineligible without due process); L. TRIBE, supra note 74, at 503 (procedural
rights distinct from right to outcome).
100. The procedures set forth in this Note are intended as a guiding first step. As
more experience is acquired under these rules, adjustments may be made that will
further enhance the fairness and accuracy of the proceedings.
101. This also requires adequate notice to prepare and present such comments. See
Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 171-72 (1951) (Frankfurter,
J., concurring); Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 506, 314 (1950).
102. See Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349 (1977) (plurality opinion) (prohibiting trial
court's reliance on confidential information in determining death sentence). Testimony
under oath and the opportunity for cross-examination of adverse witnesses would pro-
vide additional protection against inaccuracy. See McComicK's HANDBOOK OF THE LAW
OF EvIDENCE § 245, at 581-83 (2d ed. 1972). The Supreme Court has limited this right for
prisoners in liberty-interest cases in order to protect confidential informers. Wolff v.
McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 566 (1974); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 487 (1972). How-
ever, the importance of reliability in death cases would clearly outweigh any advantages
of such evidence. See Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 359 (1977) (plurality opinion).
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sion in a manner consistent with the historical and contemporary
models of clemency.103
In practice, this hearing would be dominated by the clemency ap-
plicant and state authorities. To ensure its effectiveness, the state
should provide adequate resources to an indigent applicant0 for
the preparation of his presentation. 1 5 At a minimum, the state should
guarantee the assistance of counsel. 06 Because certain considerations
-typically, evidence of the applicant's remorse-cannot adequately be
conveyed on paper, all applicants should be entitled to a personal ap-
103. Procedural protection would also enhance the inherent fairness of the proceed-
ing. See note 74 supra (discussing intrinsic value theory of procedure).
104. Indigency is a likely characteristic of a death row inmate. See Bowers & Pierce,
Arbitrariness and Discrimination under Post-Furman Capital Statutes, 26 CRIM. & DELIN-
QuENcy 563, 580-85 (1980) (numerous studies show that offenders most likely to receive
death sentence belong to racial minority or lower class); Riedel, Discrimination in the
Imposition of the Death Penalty: A Comparison of Characteristics of Offenders Sen-
tenced Pre-Furman and Post-Furman, 49 TEMPLE L.Q. 261, 284-85 (1976) (death row
inmates disproportionately poor, black, uneducated, unskilled); DiSalle, supra note 16,
at 72 (death row inmates are without funds for adequate defense).
105. The Court should apply to clemency its reasoning in Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S.
12 (1952):
It is true that a State is not required by the Federal Constitution to provide appellate
courts or a right to appellate review at all. But that is not to say that a State that
does grant appellate review can do so in a way that discriminates against some
convicted defendants on account of their poverty.
Id. at 18 (citations omitted); see Mayer v. City of Chicago, 404 U.S. 189, 196-97 (1971)("flat prohibition against pricing indigent defendants out of as effective an appeal as would
be available to others who pay their own way"); Burns v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 252, 258 (1959)(indigents must have same opportunity to invoke discretion of courts as those who can
afford costs).
In fact, the theoretical basis of Griffin is even more compelling for capital clemency.
First, there is a constitutional difference in death as a punishment. See note 68 supra.
In addition, the integral role played by clemency in the capital punishment system, see
notes 10, 30-40, 95 supra, might make the elimination of the opportunity for clemency
constitutionally fatal. See note 95 supra. Analytically, then, clemency may be closer to
an appeal of right than to the discretionary appeal protected in Griffin.
106. The Supreme Court has long recognized that the right to be heard would be
of little avail if it did not include the right to counsel. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S.
45, 68-69 (1932). In a post-conviction setting, the Court requires appointment of counsel
for indigents when information obtained after conviction may affect the sentence. See
Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128, 134-37 (1967) (attorney required whether proceeding
labelled probation revocation or deferred sentencing); Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 605, 608
(1967) (attorney required for additional determination to be made for sentencing under
sex-offender's statute); cf. note 17 supra (new information may be heard by clemency
authority in making its determination). Counsel is also provided for an appeal as of
right Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 355 (1963). Indeed, the guiding hand of counsel,
Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. at 69, is a requirement of due process at every critical stage
of criminal proceedings by the state against an individual. See Estelle v. Smith, 49 U.S.L.W.
4490, 4494 (U.S. May 19, 1981); Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 7 (1970) (plurality
opinion); United States v. Wade, 338 U.S. 218, 227 (1949). The clemency decision is such
a critical stage, and thus the appointment of counsel is necessary. See p. 905 supra(power of state most dramatic at clemency stage); notes 10, 30-40, 95 supra (clemency
integral part of process of determining punishment).
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pearance before the decisionmaker.10 7 The value of individualized sen-
tencing established by the death penalty cases would be ill served if,
at the end of the capital punishment process, the clemency authority
had a less vivid impression of the offender's character than that ac-
quired by the prosecutor, the jury, and the judges in the case.
Particular cases may raise issues for the clemency decisionmaker that
would require further formal proceedings if the state is to meet the
standards of individualized sentencing and minimizing informational
error. The assistance of psychiatric personnel, criminologists, or other
specialists might be required to help petitioner and his counsel raise
and define issues that otherwise would not be presented to the clem-
ency authority.108 The application might raise questions that cannot
be resolved without the hearing of oral evidence by the clemency de-
cisionmaker, or designated agents, involving exercise of subpoena pow-
ers and oath-taking. 10 The specific requirements in each case would,
however, depend on the nature of the issues raised in the course of
the clemency process.
Although judicial review of the adequacy of the clemency process,
if challenged by the clemency applicant, should be informed by the
procedural standards of the death penalty cases, the clemency decision
could remain substantively unreviewable. A judicial examination of
107. See Shapiro Interview, supra note 12 (personal appearance necessary to determine
appropriateness of punishment for individual); cf. Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978)
(Burger, C.J.) (prohibiting exclusion from sentencing hearing of any relevant mitigating
evidence); Green v. United States, 365 U.S. 301, 304 (1961) (right of allocution is personal
to accused, not merely counsel); FED. R. CiuM. P. 32(a)(1) (defendant shall have right
to personal statement before sentencing).
Of course, this would in no way infringe upon the applicant's right not to appear,
whether to make a more favorable impression or for any other reason. See Estelle v.
Smith, 49 U.S.L.W. 4490, 4492 (U.S. May 19, 1981) (rejecting contention that constitu-
tional protection against self-incrimination limited to preconviction); In re Gault, 387
U.S. 1, 49 (1967) (Fifth Amendment protection turns on nature of admission rather than
on nature of proceeding).
108. See Shapiro Interview, supra note 12 (investigative, diagnostic, and other expert
assistance necessary fully to develop issues presented in clemency application); Lee Inter-
view, supra note 16 (state consults experts when necessary in investigating clemency
applications).
109. An oral hearing would also increase the value of the information presented to
the clemency authority by permitting both the decisionmaker and the parties to focus
on factors of interest to the decisionmaker. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 269, 270
(1970); Stewart, supra note 98, at 1813; cf. Shapiro Interview, supra note 12 (oral testimony
of witnesses such as psychiatrists, prison chaplain, and family of applicant more effective
than written affidavits).
Courts have debated, in the administrative law context, whether oral procedures should
be required in order to probe and augment the documentary record. Compare Inter-
national Harvester Co. v. Ruckleshaus, 478 F.2d 615, 649 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (granting right
to cross-examination) with Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 48-53 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
426 U.S. 941 (1976) (denying right to cross-examination).
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the clemency authority's decision to deny or grant the applicant cer-
tain procedures should be conducted in a way that would not influ-
ence the clemency authority's decision on the merits of the petition,
or compromise the independence of the clemency decisionmaking
process.
Conclusion
The Supreme Court has set high procedural standards to reduce
the risk of informational error and provide individualized sentencing
in death penalty cases. Yet the effect of procedural protection early
in the capital punishment process is negated when the lack of pro-
cedural protection reintroduces those risks at the clemency stage. Cer-
tain due process guarantees should be extended to capital clemency
to protect the constitutional values expressed by the Court when life
is at stake.
